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PRIVATIZING PROFESSIONALISM:  
CLIENT CONTROL OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 
Christopher J. Whelan* & Neta Ziv**
INTRODUCTION 
 
The nature of the lawyer-client relationship is “one of the most contested 
areas of professional ethics.”1  In the corporate client “hemisphere”2 of 
legal practice, and especially in the global marketplace, studies have 
suggested that the traditional model of the lawyer, as an independent 
professional, exercising professional judgment, has all but disappeared.  At 
best, there is “commercialized professional[ism]”;3 at worst, lawyers are 
“more akin to a cog in a machine.”4
Deborah Rhode, for example, has argued that law firms have become 
tainted with commercialism, to the detriment of their lofty professionalism.
 
5
Lawyers have come to feel genuinely affronted and indignant when any 
authority tries to articulate a public obligation of lawyers that may end up 
putting them at odds with clients.  We have no public obligations, they 
  
Robert Gordon has noted that the client-centered focus of lawyers is in 
danger of reducing their public professional obligations to virtually zero: 
 
*  Associate Director, International Law Programmes and Member, Faculty of Law, 
University of Oxford; Visiting Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of 
Law; Barrister, 3 Paper Buildings, Temple, London.   
**  Director, The Cegla Clinical Law Programs, The Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv 
University.   
  We are grateful to Dan D. Sandman, Thomas E. Spahn (McGuire Woods), Nick 
Krebs, and the other lawyers in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel who agreed to 
be interviewed; to Matthias Kaseorg, Penn Clarke (W&L), and Oded Bakal (TAU) for their 
research assistance; to Christine Parker for her comments on an earlier draft; and to the other 
participants at the Fordham University School of Law’s colloquium on Globalization and the 
Legal Profession, held at Fordham University in October 2011.  Unless otherwise indicated, 
the interviews cited in this Article were conducted by us on a confidential basis between 
February and October 2011.  We have confirmed the veracity of the interviewees’ 
statements, which have been lightly edited by the Fordham Law Review. 
 1. ANDREW BOON & JENNIFER LEVIN, THE ETHICS AND CONDUCT OF LAWYERS IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES 178 (2d ed. 2008). 
 2. See generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:  THE 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 127–69 (1982) (chapter on “The Hemispheres of the Legal 
Profession”). 
 3. GERARD HANLON, LAWYERS, THE STATE AND THE MARKET:  PROFESSIONALISM 
REVISITED 123 (1999). 
 4. BOON & LEVIN, supra note 1, at 187. See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS 
PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:  TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991) 
(analyzing the organizational structure and incentives for lawyers in large law firms). 
 5. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:  REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 9 (2000). 
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claim; we are private agents for private parties . . . our loyalties to clients 
must be absolute and undivided.6
Gordon refers to this as a libertarian ideology that “privatizes the lawyer’s 
role.”
 
7  In this context, “[i]ndependence from the client . . . is generally not 
a legitimate aspiration for the bar.”8  In place of independence, there is a 
moral interdependence between lawyer and corporate client.9
The question then arises:  what kind of ethics do large corporate clients 
want of their lawyers?
 
10  No one doubts the commercial pressures of legal 
practice in general and corporate legal practice in particular,11 and the 
impact these can have on lawyers’ ethical conduct.  One possibility is that 
corporations “want litigators who will press for every advantage and 
counselors who will exploit every regulatory loophole, not lawyers who feel 
bound by nebulous duties that supposedly arise from being an officer of the 
court.”12  But it is possible to envisage corporate clients that might be 
willing to subordinate their immediate commercial interests to the lawyers’ 
professional responsibilities, or who see “ethical behavior as important to 
their long-term commercial stability and . . . profitability.”13
In order to probe into the relationship between global corporations and 
their lawyers, we have examined clients’ Outside Counsel Guidelines (OC 
Guidelines or Guidelines), or other formal terms of engagement, as well as 
informal norms that shape the relationship between lawyers and clients.  
Our main finding is that corporate clients, and in particular global 
corporations, are gaining influence and control over lawyers’ practices at a 
scope significantly above and beyond what had been customary in the 
past.
 
14
 
 6. Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve:  The Bar’s Response to Kaye 
Scholer, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 315, 320 (1998). 
  In particular, norms relating to lawyers’ practice that had formerly 
been under the domain of professional and state bodies, or left to the 
discretion of lawyers and their firms, are increasingly incorporated into 
 7. Id. at 321. 
 8. Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1281, 1281 (2003). 
 9. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and 
Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 520 (1994). 
 10. ADRIAN EVANS, ASSESSING LAWYERS’ ETHICS:  A PRACTITIONERS’ GUIDE 16 (2011). 
 11. See Anthony T. Kronman, Professionalism, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 89, 
90 (1999) (“[A] new and aggressive culture of commercial values . . . is spreading through 
the profession as a whole.”). See generally MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL:  THE 
FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004) (analyzing the divergence of a lawyer’s 
commercial interests and ethical obligations). 
 12. Milton C. Regan, Taxes and Death:  The Rise and Demise of an American Law 
Firm, in STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY:  LAW FIRMS, LEGAL CULTURE, AND LEGAL 
PRACTICE 107, 108–09 (Austin Sara ed., 2010) . 
 13. EVANS, supra note 10, at 16. 
 14. Research by Robert Eli Rosen observes changes in corporate clients’ structures, 
management styles, and culture as the locus from which to analyze lawyers’ practices. See 
Robert Eli Rosen, We’re All Consultants Now:  How Change in Client Organizational 
Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 637 (2002).  We join this approach, while focusing mainly on material that addresses 
lawyers’ conduct—namely, OC Guidelines—though in the broader context of corporate 
clients’ altering ethics and policies. 
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“guidelines,” “procedures,” “codes of conduct,” “manuals,” or “best 
practices” memoranda, which lawyers are expected to follow. 
The topics incorporated in the guidelines vary to a great extent.  They 
include instructions that by tradition have been part of bilateral negotiations 
between lawyers and clients, namely fees and billing terms; but they also 
incorporate directives on topics that have constituted the core of lawyers’ 
ethics, such as conflicts of interest, client confidentiality, and professional 
conduct during litigation and discovery proceedings.  They also relate to 
matters that have been part of law firms’ business prerogatives, such as 
workplace employment diversity or “work-life balance/family friendly” 
employment policies.  In some instances, we have identified guidelines that 
require lawyers to act as “gatekeepers” for the client, and to report 
misbehavior of corporate officers to management.  Many codes and 
guidelines include an expectation that their lawyers act “ethically” and with 
“integrity,” an interesting point in and of itself, as one would think that this 
requirement ought to be obvious.  These guidelines and norms are not the 
outcome of private negotiation between lawyer and client, but are imposed 
unilaterally upon lawyers retained by the corporate client.  Thus they are 
evolving into a new kind of regulation, this time by private clients, hence 
the notion of “privatizing professionalism.”  We are interested in learning 
about this form of control and how it is affecting the practice of lawyers, 
including law firm structure, the management of lawyers’ multiple loyalties 
(to clients, third parties, and others), their relationship with professional 
bodies (law societies) and the state, and their claim for professional 
autonomy. 
This Article demonstrates that in some cases the guidelines clearly 
protect the direct and immediate interests of the client, as recognized in 
conventional corporate law and lawyers’ ethics.  In other words, lawyers are 
expected to maximize the interests and benefits of their corporate clients 
(financial, reputational, etc.), regardless of potential adverse consequences 
to others.  But there are also rules that do not strictly follow this rationale.  
These include workplace diversity requirements in outside counsel law 
firms, prohibitions on using obstructive and coercive tactics in litigation, 
the duty to protect the integrity of the justice system, the duty to consider 
and favor negotiation and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) over 
contentious adversarial strategies, and the general duty to act “ethically.” 
In order to discuss this development, we draw upon two theoretical 
paradigms and bodies of literature:  (1) the regulation of the legal 
profession, which we suggest that OC Guidelines should be considered a 
part of; and (2) the changing roles of inside versus outside counsel in 
corporate practice.  We then present an overview of our research findings, 
which are based on a review of over twenty sets of Guidelines (summarized 
in an Appendix), and interviews with twenty in-house and outside lawyers 
and general counsel in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel.  
Following this, we set out some of the main elements of Walmart’s Outside 
Counsel Procedures, since they illustrate just how detailed and ambitious 
such procedures can be.  Finally, we argue that OC Guidelines constitute a 
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form of “privatized professionalism,” and consider some of the implications 
of this conceptualization. 
I.  LAWYERS’ REGULATION 
The changing nature of lawyers’ regulation has received much attention 
in recent years.  Some have addressed the topic prescriptively and 
normatively—asking about the best arrangement for lawyers’ regulation.15  
Others have been descriptive—telling us about past, current, and future 
arrangements that will govern lawyers’ terms of professional engagement.16  
Comparative perspectives have tied particular arrangements to the 
historical, cultural, and political conditions of law and lawyers in a 
particular society and country,17 as part of globalization and the changing 
role of the market and the state.18  The topic has been related to 
developments in technology19 and changes in legal culture.20
Whatever the methodology, this research most often discusses the 
question of lawyers’ regulation through a paradigmatic dichotomy of state 
regulation versus self-regulation.  Under this paradigm, the field of 
lawyers’ regulation is confined to a continuum:  on one end, there is a 
strong system of autonomous regulation by the profession’s institutions 
(mainly law societies but also courts), while at the other end, the profession 
is regulated by state bodies, including legislatures (federal and state), 
administrative agencies, and the civil courts. 
 
 
 15. See, e.g., Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149 
(2010); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992). 
 16. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 14; Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics, Nationalizing 
Law Practice, and the Future of the American Legal Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 489 (2011); Alice Woolley, Rhetoric and Realities:  What Independence of 
the Bar Requires of Lawyer Regulation (July 3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1877884. 
 17. See, e.g., 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY:  THE COMMON LAW WORLD (Richard L. Abel & 
Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 2005); 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY:  THE CIVIL LAW WORLD (Richard L. 
Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 2005); CHRISTINE PARKER, JUST LAWYERS:  REGULATION AND 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1999); Susan Saab Fortney, Tales of Two Regimes for Regulating 
Limited Liability Law Firms in the US and Australia:  Client Protection and Risk 
Management Lessons, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 230 (2009); David McQuoid-Mason, Access to 
Justice in South Africa:  Are There Enough Lawyers?, 22 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 213 
(2003); Amit M. Sachdeva & Sachin Sachdeva, The Indian LLP Law:  Some Concerns for 
Lawyers and Chartered Accountants, 92 SEBI & CORP. L. 1 (2009); Neta Ziv, Regulation of 
Israeli Lawyers:  From Professional Autonomy to Multi-institutional Regulation, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1763 (2009). 
 18. See generally Carole Silver, Regulatory Mismatch in the International Market for 
Legal Services, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 487 (2003); Laurel S. Terry, The European 
Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional Services, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 1 (2009); Christopher J. Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism:  Global Law 
Practice Means Business, 27 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 465 (2008). 
 19. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?  RETHINKING THE NATURE 
OF LEGAL SERVICES (2009) (describing how emerging technologies have radically changed 
the legal field). 
 20. See generally Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public 
Opinion, Installment Two:  How Far Should Corporate Attorneys Go?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1119 (2010) (analyzing how public opinion is shaping legal culture). 
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David Wilkins mapped the regulatory systems in the United States.21    
These mechanisms shift from “self-regulatory” schemes (disciplinary 
proceedings) via administrative control, oversight (institutional), and court-
based norm setting (liability controls) to legislative interventions.  Fred C. 
Zacharias has argued that the claim for self-regulation is a “misnomer,” and 
that the legal profession in the United States had always been heavily 
regulated by a variety of state and federal institutions.22  When John 
Leubsdorf claimed that legal ethics are “falling apart,” he meant that 
regulating lawyers’ conduct is not done by “the state or states in which the 
lawyer is acting,” but also by “state and federal legislators, administrators, 
and others.”23
Since the mid-1990s, literature on regulation has embarked upon the 
implications of globalization and world capitalism as overarching, 
hegemonic ideologies that affect regulation in general, and that of the legal 
profession in particular.  From this direction, lawyers have increasingly 
been exposed to pressures to renounce their special status and privileges, as 
their professional knowledge is not considered different from that of any 
other profession.
  Thus the state has been a central part of this discussion. 
24  Lawyers are being treated as any other “service 
provider”; in fact, “the service providers paradigm” is replacing the 
professional paradigm.25  As Laurel Terry describes, this shift has been 
induced by the European Union, NAFTA (through the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative), the 1994 General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), and the World Trade Organization.26  Their shared position has 
been that lawyers ought to be regulated under the general “disciplines” (i.e., 
market regulation) of service providers, with no distinctive regulatory 
status.27  Although not states in the traditional structure, these institutions, 
agreements, and fora are heavily state-dominated.  This approach was met 
with objection from bar associations and law societies, including the 
American Bar Association (ABA), the Council of Bars and Law Societies 
of Europe (CCBE), and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA).28  
These organizations were particularly concerned with the approach that 
addresses lawyers’ regulatory arrangements in tandem with non-lawyer 
service providers.29
 
 21. See Wilkins, supra note 
 
15, at 805–09 (discussing mechanisms for addressing 
lawyers’ misconduct).   
 22. Fred C. Zacharias, The “Self-Regulation” Misnomer, in REAFFIRMING LEGAL 
ETHICS:  TAKING STOCK AND NEW IDEAS 188 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010); see also Fred 
C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009). 
 23. John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 959 (2009). 
 24. Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession:  The Impact of 
Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers,” 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189; John Flood, 
Will There Be Fallout from Clementi?  The Global Repercussions for the Legal Profession 
After the UK Legal Services Act 2007, (Miami-Fla. Eur. Union Ctr. Jean Monnet/Robert 
Schuman Paper Series, Volume 8, No. 6, 2008) available at http://www6.miami.edu/
EUCenter/publications/FloodLong08ClementiEdi.pdf; see also Whelan, supra note 18.  
 25. Terry, supra note 24, at 189. 
 26. Id. at 190–93. 
 27. Id. at 194. 
 28. See id. at 193. 
 29. See id.  
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Thus, from a state-based or a transnational viewpoint, the discourse about 
the changing nature of lawyers’ regulation has for the most part meant a 
reallocation of power between the profession and the state.30
At this point, it is appropriate to ask whether the guidelines imposed by 
corporations upon their lawyers are in fact a regulatory regime, rather than a 
contract, similar to agreements that lawyers have always entered into with 
clients.  Contracts are often a type of regulation; indeed, they are just one 
example of “private lawmaking.”
  In this 
Article, we shift the gaze from the state–self-regulation dichotomy to global 
and multinational corporations.  We ask if and how these “new regulators” 
are shaping (de facto or potentially) “the business of law,” and what their 
impact is on lawyers’ professionalism. 
31
From a theoretical perspective, we can employ Julia Black’s definition of 
regulation as “the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of 
others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of 
producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve 
mechanisms of standard setting, information—gathering and behavior—
modification.”
 
32  This definition views regulation as de-centered, extending 
beyond state institutions, and creating a variety of forms and relationships 
between civil society, state, and private (market) actors.  Under this 
definition, an entity can be both a regulator and regulated, depending on the 
context.33
Looking at OC Guidelines and codes of conduct through this lens, we 
may be facing multiple regulatory systems applying to lawyers 
simultaneously.  Inasmuch as these documents address issues that are also 
governed by state disciplinary rules or law societies’ ethical codes, they 
may contain different standards of behavior than the “ordinary” rules.  At 
times, they set heightened standards toward clients as compared with 
traditional ethical codes; at others, they complement them with duties 
toward non-clients that are often absent from the traditional codes.  We 
  Thus these OC Guidelines need to be understood not just as a 
private arrangement between two individual parties who wish to settle on 
their terms of engagement. 
 
 30. See Christopher J. Whelan, Ethics Beyond the Horizon:  Why Regulate the Global 
Practice of Law?, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 931 (2001).  One variation of this state–
profession dichotomy is the work of John Flood on global law firms and their response to the 
profession–state re-division of power.  Flood argues that global law firms have become so 
powerful that they are out of regulatory reach of both the state regulator and the professional 
law society (or other professional institution).  Instead, they develop internal self-regulatory 
mechanisms and ethics committees.  This is yet another manifestation of soft law, a 
voluntary code of conduct similar to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) self-governance 
systems. See John Flood, The Re-landscaping of the Legal Profession:  Large Law Firms 
and Professional Re-Regulation, 59 CURRENT SOC. 507 (2011). 
 31. Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation:  Corporate Lawyers and Private 
Lawmaking, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 423 (1993). 
 32. Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTL. J. ON LEGAL PHIL. 1, 26 
(2002). 
 33. A corporate client defines norms that apply to itself, thus acting as a regulatee 
(although these norms are “soft” and not binding), and at the same time it applies norms 
upon others, acting as a regulator. 
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believe what we are witnessing is indeed a new model, often labeled as 
“private regulation.”34  Private regulation is an amalgam of norms 
originating in private corporations that aims to set behavioral standards in 
an array of contexts.  Tim Bartley describes this system as encompassing 
“coalitions of nonstate actors,” who take part in a comprehensive web of 
norm-setting activities.35  They “codify, monitor, and in some cases certify 
[commercial] firms’ compliance with labor, environmental, human rights, 
or other standards of accountability.”36  Global corporations reacting to 
these norms (often in the name of social responsibility) enter into 
transactions within transnational “chains of supply,” turning private 
regulation into a transnational phenomenon.37  Due to the lack of formal 
regulatory capacity at the global level, this situation calls for new forms of 
“global governance.”38  Hence codes of conduct imposed upon suppliers 
are part of this global governance regime and form a system of private 
regulation.39
II.  INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL 
  As we have seen, lawyers have come to be treated as other 
“suppliers”; thus, their codes also form part of this new private regulatory 
system. 
Since the 1990s, the division of professional labor between inside and 
outside counsel has been altered significantly.40  Tasks once performed by 
outside law firms are increasingly under the responsibility of inside 
counsel.41  Corporate counsel often “micro-manage” outside counsel.42  
Their once-inferior status has been elevated and they now allocate, guide, 
control, and supervise the work of outside counsel.43  The new role of 
inside counsel has spurred intensive deliberations about their professional 
independence and power vis-à-vis corporate clients.44
 
 34. See generally Ronen Shamir, Socially Responsible Private Regulation:  World 
Culture or World-Capitalism?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 313 (2011) (analyzing the 
phenomenon of corporate social private regulation in light of globalization). 
 
 35. Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization:  The Rise of 
Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOC. 
297, 298 (2007). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, Globalization and Governance, in 
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY:  POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION 1 (Miles 
Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 955 (2005); Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY 
L.J. 1201 (1997); Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers:  A Unifying 
Theory of the In-House Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77 (2011). 
 41. See generally Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and 
Entrepreneurs:  Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 457 (2000) (identifying the ideal roles for inside counsel in corporations). 
 42. Interview with Thomas E. Spahn, Partner, McGuire Woods LLP (June 19, 2011). 
 43. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 41, at 457–58. 
 44. See generally DeMott, supra note 40; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of 
Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011 (1997); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud:  Re-
Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983 (2005); Suzanne Le 
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As inside counsel gain more relative power and influence, their 
relationship with outside counsel is altered.  In the past, general counsels 
“have shown remarkably little interest in the internal management or 
practices of the law firms they employed.”45
In-house counsel closely supervise and monitor the services provided by 
external lawyers with a particular focus on ensuring that external lawyers 
fulfil their ethical responsibilities to the corporate client . . . .  The 
combined market power and technical legal expertise of corporate clients 
with in-house legal departments means that they have the capacity to hold 
their external lawyers accountable to ethical responsibilities more 
consistently and reliably than can the clients of sole practitioners and 
lawyers in smaller law firms.
  However, Suzanne Le Mire 
and Christine Parker discuss the growing evidence that corporations with 
large in-house legal departments convey high ethical expectations of their 
external lawyers:   
46
This means that it is essentially the corporate client that sets the tone for the 
ethical behavior of its lawyer:  the higher the ethical standard of the client, 
the better the chances that its lawyers behave ethically. 
   
This is hardly surprising.  The harder challenges come about when the 
officers of the corporate client wish to act unethically.  The question then 
becomes whether lawyers’ professional core values and ethical obligations 
can impede upon actual or proposed misconduct, and prevent misdeeds.  As 
the cases of Enron and other corporate scandals have shown, lawyers have 
not been able or willing to thwart their powerful clients, and in the most 
difficult and disturbing circumstances, they either did not play this 
buffering role or failed in their attempts to do so.47
In the discussion of lawyers’ role in corporate ethics, the focus of inquiry 
had been the place of lawyers’ professional independence and public 
commitments in preventing misconduct.
 
48
Our inquiries have provided an opportunity to examine these 
relationships from a different angle.  We have identified some corporate 
clients that have adopted a policy of “good social behavior” and wish to 
  In other words, it was assumed 
that clients would “behave badly” and the question had been if lawyers had 
enough power, independence, awareness, consciousness, will, tools, and 
support to act according to their acclaimed professional ideals. 
 
Mire & Christine Parker, “Keeping It In-House:  Ethics in the Relationship Between Large 
Law Firm Lawyers and Their Corporate Clients Through the Eyes of In-House Counsel, 11 
LEGAL ETHICS 201 (2008). 
 45. David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals?  Toward a New Model of the Corporate 
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2111 (2010). 
 46. Le Mire & Parker, supra note 44, at 202.  Note, though, that large corporate clients 
use both large and small law firms.  Indeed, their influence on the latter may be even greater 
than on the former. 
 47. See Christopher J. Whelan, Some Realism About Professionalism:  Core Values, 
Legality, and Corporate Law Practice, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1067, 1075–81 (2007). 
 48. See generally ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS:  THE CORPORATE SCANDAL 
READER (Nancy B. Rapoport et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (detailing the roles of lawyers in major 
corporate scandals). 
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impose it upon outside counsel.  The apparatus through which this is done 
is the inside counsel.  In some cases, inside counsel draft the corporation’s 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy (including OC Guidelines) 
and retain a great deal of power over outside law firms.  Inside counsel are 
usually familiar with the culture of large law firm practice, and thus become 
the central means of enforcing the corporation’s CSR policy. 
In sum, in the context of “corporate private regulation,” the role of inside 
counsel becomes vital in ensuring compliance with the corporate client’s 
norms, and requires new structural and substantive positioning vis-à-vis 
outside counsel.49
III.  CLIENT GUIDELINES, PROCEDURES, AND REQUIREMENTS 
OF OUTSIDE COUNSEL 
 
OC Guidelines, requirements, and procedures are commonplace,51F50 but 
there is a wide variety in terms of their scope, content, and form.  Some OC 
procedures are lengthy; others not.  Some corporate counsel took the view 
that “no one reads” long, detailed guidelines; others stated that guidelines 
are “a living document with genuine expectations.”52F51 In this section, we 
present central findings of OC Guidelines and other requirements imposed 
by clients on their lawyers.  These findings are based on the following 
sources:  a review of OC Guidelines found on the internet; a review of 
guidelines and documents provided to us through direct contacts and/or 
interviews with in-house counsel, outside counsel, and officers of 
corporations; and complementary information obtained in interviews of 
those mentioned above. 
We cover all of these sources because they provide a more complete 
picture of the normative landscape we are exploring.  Formal guidelines 
may understate (or overstate) what the company is actually doing.  The 
guidelines might set a broad standard, and include directives such as “strive 
to hire minority lawyers” or “committed to the highest ethical standards,” 
which on their face are too general to be enforced.  Several OC Guidelines 
and corporate general codes of conduct refer to following the spirit rather 
than just the letter of the law; at times, they are backed by mechanisms to 
implement these objectives.   
 
 49. In this Article, we are not looking at the role of so-called independent “standby” 
board counsel, that is, counsel hired specifically to be responsible to board members or an 
audit committee. Cf. 2006 NAT’L DIRS. INST., THE INCREASING ROLE OF INDEPENDENT 
“STANDBY” BOARD COUNSEL. 
 50. Rees W. Morrison, Hot-Button Issues in Outside Counsel Guidelines, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 
12, 2009, at 24 (“All but the smallest law departments have guidelines that they distribute to 
outside counsel.”). 
 51. Interview with General Counsel and Head of Risk Management, London law firm 
(Sept. 2011) (it is notable that law firms designate positions of this sort). 
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A.  Processes and Means of Applying Guidelines and Requirements 
upon Outside Counsel 
As demonstrated in the Appendix, some corporations have formal, well-
established guidelines or codes of conduct applying to lawyers retained as 
OC.  However, the process under which law firms are retained as outside 
counsel is also telling of the reworking of conventional patterns of the 
lawyer–corporate client relationship.  Interviews with corporations and 
clients reveal that retention of a law firm is often conducted as part of the 
corporation’s procurement activities.52  The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, for example, publishes information about 
“outside counsel services” under the following hierarchical rubrics:  
“Working with us/Procurement/Outside Counsel services.”53
In the most blatant expression of this trend, lawyers in one U.K. firm 
stated that the same corporate department purchases “loo rolls” (toilet 
paper) and legal services.
 
54  Some corporations utilize tenders or Request 
for Proposals for outside counsel, which then become the formal documents 
under which lawyers would be regulated; others initiate contacts with law 
firms, asking them to submit proposals to be retained by the corporation.  
Under these procurement procedures, law firms may be required to provide 
information about the firm and its employees.55
B.  Obtaining Information About Law Firms’ Business and Employees 
  The point we would like to 
underscore is that whether through prescribed outside counsel guidelines, 
formal procurement procedures, or business negotiations, the terms of 
retention of lawyers’ services are being standardized and treated similar to 
other procurements of goods or services.  Conditions of retention are then 
converted into the new regulatory scheme that applies to lawyers. 
During the procurement process, and often as part of their reporting 
duties, law firms are required to provide detailed information about their 
business affairs, staff, administrative practices, and employment policies.  
This is a trend to which some law firms are not easily getting accustomed, 
and some consider it to be an unreasonable intrusion into their business 
prerogatives.  In our reviews of OC Guidelines and interviews of inside and 
outside counsel we have come across the following data that law firms are 
asked to provide as a condition for working with the corporate client:  staff 
and structure (partners, associates, paralegals); profitability and revenues; 
employees’ background check for criminal and credit records; permission to 
conduct drug testing of employees (upon hiring and subsequently at client 
request); employee computer security conduct requirements (shut down and 
 
 52. Id.; Interview with General Counsel at an Israeli company that develops electro-optic 
systems (Mar. 2011). 
 53. Outside Counsel Services, EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/workingwithus/procurement/ocs.shtml (last updated Feb. 16, 
2011) (OC services appear in the same rubric as project procurement, consultancy services, 
and corporate procurement). 
 54. Interview with London law firm partner (Sept. 2011). 
 55. See infra Part III.B. 
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lock computers); financial auditing; the duty to award full credit for all 
corporate client’s work coming into the firm to a designated “Relational 
Partner” (which must be selected from a “diverse pool” of candidates);56 
the general ethical record of the firm and its lawyers (even if not related to 
work with the corporate client); employees’ freedom to join trade unions; 
environmental policies; limitations on working hours, including those of the 
lawyers;57
Not all corporations impose all of these requirements, but there is a 
definite pattern whereby corporate clients become more involved and obtain 
a higher level of control over many aspects of law firm conduct.  While in 
the past, corporate client control had been concerned only with the legal 
services it received from its lawyers (through billing arrangements and the 
like), this is changing.  Corporate clients are involving themselves in areas 
of operation that are only remotely connected to the law.  Some of them can 
be associated with the client’s interest, such as information security or law 
firm auditing.  Others seem to originate from the client’s CSR (or other) 
policies, such as recycling requirements or freedom to join trade unions.  
Still others can fulfill both criteria, such as diversity and work-life balance 
requirements. 
 information security and IT auditing; and whistleblowing 
policies and protection. 
C.  Length, Content, and Scope 
At one end of the spectrum, we found lengthy documents containing 
detailed requirements in many areas of operation:  billing, fee arrangements 
and control over expenses, minute activity reporting and detailed 
coordination requirements with inside counsel, data collection on law firm 
practices, information security instructions, litigation policy, media 
contacts, diversity requirements, conflicts of interests, and confidentiality.  
Examples of this include Walmart and Bank of America.58
 
 56. See infra Part III.C. 
  At the other 
end, there were very brief guidelines for outside counsel, running just two 
or three pages, intended to be “user-friendly” and practical, such as a two-
page laminated document that could be placed on everyone’s desk.  Such 
guidelines, issued for example by a multinational beverage company and 
 57. See infra Part III.J. 
 58. Interestingly, some non-corporate clients also have OC Procedures.  One example is 
the State of New Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, 
OFFICE OF N.J. ATT’Y GEN., OUTSIDE COUNSEL GUIDELINES (2011); see also infra Appendix 
(listing the State of Minnesota and Maricopa County College as non-corporate clients with 
OC requirements).  New Jersey’s OC are expected to represent the state “with integrity, 
professionalism, and a sense of urgency in resolving legal problems,” and in accordance 
“with the highest ethical standards.” DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, supra at 1, 4.  The 
guidelines deal with several ethical issues, including conflicts of interest, confidentiality, 
litigation and advice matters, contingency fee litigation, pleadings and motions, settlement, 
and ADR.  It may well be that public agencies are adopting methods and standards set by 
global corporations, a part of an overall neoliberal worldview. 
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the Export-Import Bank of the United States,59 contained general  
instructions on engagement, conflicts of interest, and ethical standards, 
followed by issues such as diversity goals, case management, and billing 
procedures.  A mid-length version is Wachovia Corporation’s Legal 
Division General Guidance.60  OC firms and their lawyers have to agree to 
follow the requirements, terms, and conditions of Wachovia’s OC 
Guidelines.  Lawyers are expected to deliver “high quality, cost-effective 
legal services.”61  The ethical issues discussed in the policy include 
conflicts of interest (broadly defined), attorney-client privilege, 
confidentiality, adverse publicity and contacts with the media, and 
instructions regarding “defensive litigation,” including settlement, 
pleadings, discovery, appeals, and lawyer diversity.62
D.  Specific Versus General Codes 
 
Many large corporations have general Codes of Conduct or CSR 
Reviews, either in addition to OC Guidelines or as exclusive documents 
that apply across the organization.  These include Bank of America,63 
Boeing,64 GE,65 Merck,66 and Coca-Cola.67
 
 59. See Guidelines for Representation of Ex-Im Bank by Outside Counsel in Finance 
Matters, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK U.S., http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/Outside
CounselGuidelines.pdf. 
  Documents of this sort provide 
a wide framework potentially affecting ethical conduct by OC.  One 
multinational beverage corporation we studied had a very short set of 
guidelines for OC, but in addition to requiring OC to “maintain the highest 
 60. Wachovia, Legal Division General Guidance (on file with authors).  Wachovia was 
taken over by Wells Fargo in 2008.  Wells Fargo Legal Division’s Engagement of Outside 
Counsel is similar in length and content (though not identical) to Wachovia’s.  Sections deal 
with retention, diversity, conflicts, attorney-client privilege, confidentiality, the media, and 
compliance. See Legal Division – Engagement of Outside Counsel, WELLS FARGO, 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/legal/engagement (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. BANK OF AMERICA, CODE OF ETHICS ii (2012), available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-govconduct (follow “Code of Ethics” hyperlink) 
(“The Code is based on our company’s Core Values. . . .  The Code of Ethics provides the 
guidance we need to translate our values into action as we compete in the marketplace and 
engage with customers, clients, shareholders, vendors and each other.”). 
 64. BOEING, ETHICAL BUSINESS CONDUCT GUIDELINES 4, available at 
http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/ethics/ethics_booklet.pdf (“We will always 
take the high road by practicing the highest ethical standards.”); id. at 5 (“The highest 
standards of ethical business conduct are required of Boeing employees.”). 
 65. GE, 2009 CITIZENSHIP REPORT: RENEWING RESPONSIBILITIES 36, available at 
http://files.gecompany.com/gecom/citizenship/pdfs/ge_2009_citizenship_report.pdf (“The 
GE commitment to perform with integrity . . . .  is guided by our integrity policy, The Spirit 
& The Letter . . . .”). 
 66. MERCK, LOOKING AHEAD:  2009-2010 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REVIEW 15 
(2010), available at http://www.merckresponsibility.com/downloads/Merck-2009-CSR-
Report.pdf (“[T]o ensure Merck achieves its business goals while meeting the letter and 
spirit of the complex regulatory framework in which we operate.”). 
 67. COCA-COLA, CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT:  ACTING WITH INTEGRITY AROUND THE 
GLOBE (Apr. 2009), http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/ourcompany/pdf/COBC_
English.pdf. 
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ethical standards at all times,” also linked this to its Code of Business 
Conduct. 
In some corporations, lawyers’ terms of engagement are included under 
“ethical” and CSR directives that govern suppliers.68  GE, for example, has 
a broad directive for all of its suppliers:  the corporation’s “Integrity Guide 
for Suppliers, Contractors and Consultants”69 includes detailed 
requirements on issues such as minimum age of employees, prohibition of 
forced labor, environmental compliance, health and safety, and human 
rights of employees,70 and concludes with a prohibition on the use of 
subcontractors or other third parties to evade legal requirements applicable 
to the supplier.71  Apple’s “Supplier Code of Conduct” also has broad 
requirements regarding workers and human rights (including freedom of 
association, bargaining, and unionizing), health and safety standards, 
protecting the environment, and “ethics.”72  Ethics includes maintaining fair 
business standards, whistleblower protection, community engagement, 
protection of intellectual property, and no tolerance of corruption.73
E.  Goals and Objectives of Outside Counsel Guidelines 
  
Although these codes apply to all suppliers, including lawyers, our main 
focus will be on norms that address lawyers distinctively. 
A review of guidelines, as well as interviews with law firms and inside 
counsel, reveal a mixture of underlying motives; however, in most cases, 
cost-effectiveness is emphasized.  Bank of America’s litigation philosophy, 
for example, illustrates this duality:  “1. Advocacy:  Bank of America, 
while maintaining strong advocacy positions, seeks to facilitate the cost-
effective resolution of claims.  2. High Ethics:  Outside counsel 
representing Bank of America is expected at all times to maintain the 
highest ethical standards.  Coercive, dilatory or obstructive tactics are not to 
be used.”74  In general, outside counsel are instructed “to uphold[] high 
standards of professional and ethical conduct, and to ensur[e] timely, 
responsive, and cost-effective service.”75
 
 68. See, e.g., Supplier Diversity, AT&T, http://www.att.com/gen/corporate-citizenship?
pid=17724 (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 
 69. See Integrity Guide for Suppliers, Contractors and Consultants, GE (Sept. 2009), 
http://files.gecompany.com/gecom/citizenship/pdfs/ge_integrity_guide_suppliers_2009.pdf. 
 70. This section cautions against the following:   
Failure to respect human rights of Supplier’s employees.  Failure to observe 
applicable laws and regulations governing wage and hours.  Failure to allow 
workers to freely choose whether or not to organize or join associations for the 
purpose of collective bargaining as provided by local law or regulation.  Failure to 
prohibit discrimination, harassment and retaliation. 
Id. at 3. 
 71. Id. at 4. 
 72. See Apple Supplier Code of Conduct, APPLE  1–5 (2010), http://images.apple.com/
supplierresponsibility/pdf/Supplier_Code_of_Conduct_V3_3.pdf. 
 73. Id. at 5–6. 
 74. BANK OF AMERICA, OUTSIDE COUNSEL PROCEDURES 12 (2011), available at 
http://www.bankofamerica.com/suppliers/files/legalprocedures.pdf. 
 75. Id. at 3. 
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A clear impression drawn from interviews with law firms is that if “doing 
good” corresponds with “doing well” for the corporation, the higher the 
probability the policy will be enforced.  This seems to be the case with 
diversity requirements:  they are not only “the right thing to do,” but also 
are considered good business practice.76  Likewise, what seems to be fair 
litigation policy (early and prompt conflict resolution, preference for 
settlements, avoidance of combative discovery practices, prohibition of 
protracted motion practice), can be regarded as good ethical standards as 
well as good business tactics.77  This “market-embedded morality,” as 
coined by Ronen Shamir,78 seems to be a suitable framework for these 
norms.  It seems that the ethics and morality of corporate activities 
strengthen and sustain their immediate market interests and, in the long run, 
reinforce visions of neoliberal citizenship and responsible social action.79
F.  Finances:  Billing, Fees, and Costs 
 
Most OC Guidelines include provisions about the financial arrangements 
between lawyers and corporations.  Indeed, some of the surveyed guidelines 
include instructions on these issues only.  They contain detailed instructions 
about the need to report on and get approval of litigation strategy, staffing 
(limit on the number of lawyers on a case), litigation motions, appeal 
procedures, billing arrangements (hourly or other), expenses and 
reimbursements (travel, mail, telephone calls, photocopying)—all to be 
handled via arranged structures determined by the client.  No doubt the 
close supervision of lawyers’ fees and expenses is a relatively novel 
development, the outcome of a shift in law firm structure and modes of 
practice vis-à-vis corporate clients.80
G.  Customary Ethical Topics 
  We consider these arrangements not 
for their own sake, but as part of the all-encompassing transformation in the 
lawyer–corporate client relationship:  as clients gain more control over 
lawyers’ practices and dictate the terms of their work as part of their overall 
business operations, instructions about billing and ethical practices are often 
part of the same engagement record. 
Some OC Guidelines include directives relating to conflicts of interest 
and confidentiality.  These instructions cover topics that traditionally have 
been under the jurisdiction of law societies and promulgated through 
 
 76. Interview with in-house counsel (July 2011). 
 77. See, e.g., Walmart, Bank of America, Fannie Mae, Universal Underwriters Group, 
and the State of Minnesota, infra Appendix. 
 78. See Ronen Shamir, The Age of Responsibilization:  On Market-Embedded Morality, 
37 ECON. & SOC. 1 (2008). 
 79. See id. at 4. 
 80. The literature on changes in law firm structure and law firm client relations is vast. 
See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation:  The Growing Economic Cost of 
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008); Larry E. 
Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749. 
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disciplinary rules.81
Boston Scientific Corporation (a company that develops “innovative 
medical solutions”) requires that its OC refrain not only from direct 
conflicts (regarding information and data obtained within the lawyer-client 
relationship), but also from indirect and positional conflicts.
  However, a significant number of guidelines address 
them and set new standards for lawyers’ conduct.  It is beyond the scope of 
this Article to provide a detailed account comparing disciplinary standards 
and those included in OC Guidelines; however, an overview of selected 
documents and interviews with law firms demonstrates that conflict-of-
interest norms are included to set a heightened standard for lawyers by their 
clients. 
82  The 
corporation lists over forty competitor companies that OC may not 
represent, “regardless of the nature of the representation,” without first 
receiving permission from the corporation.83  A large beverage company 
holds the same policy regarding its main competitor.84  The Export-Import 
Bank of the United States has a detailed appendix for conflicts of interest 
that specifies in minute detail what it considers a “potentially adverse or 
divergent interest,” restricting a lawyer who has worked with them from 
subsequent representation.85
 
 81. Rules promulgated on conflicts and confidentiality by Law Societies were never 
exclusive, of course, and there had always been indirect regulation of them by courts, such as 
when they were asked to disqualify lawyers during representation due to a conflict of 
interest. See SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. FOX, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD:  
PROBLEMS, LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 262, 263 (2004) (“In the half past 
century, however, courts have examined most conflicts of interest in the context of motions 
to disqualify lawyers. . . .  [L]itigation over the past 50 years has left no doubt that courts 
can, and should, disqualify lawyers when their conduct threatens the fairness of a judicial 
proceeding.”).  Courts have also addressed conflicts in criminal proceedings, for example 
when defendants argued that the right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated 
due to conflict of interest of his lawyer or a violation of the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality. 
See Case Comment, Criminal Law—Conflicts of Interest—First Circuit Rules that a 
Defendant Whose Lawyer Had a Conflict that the Judge Should Have Known About Must 
Show Adverse Effect to Receive a New Trial.—Mountjoy v. Warden, New Hampshire State 
Prison, 115 HARV. L. REV. 938 (2002).  On confidentiality, see McClure v. Thompson, 323 
F.3d 1233, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2003). 
  One partner that we interviewed noted that 
banks are particularly strict regarding conflict-of-interest rules, while oil 
 82. See BOS. SCI. CORP., PARTNERSHIP GUIDELINES FOR MATTER HANDLING AND BILLING 
PRACTICES § G (2011) (on file with authors) (“It is important that you are sensitive to both 
direct conflicts and indirect conflicts, i.e., conflicts that may arise from your firm’s advocacy 
of other clients’ positions which conflict with BSC’s business objectives.  If your firm is 
designated as a ‘BSC preferred provider,’ we expect that the firm will not take public 
positions adverse to BSC (e.g., in litigation or administrative proceedings). Your firm cannot 
participate in any manner in any lawsuit against BSC.”).  A lawyer from a large U.S. firm 
admitted that restrictions regarding “positional conflicts” are potentially problematic. 
Interview with Thomas E. Spahn, supra note 42. 
 83. BOS. SCI. CORP., supra note 82, § G. 
 84. Interview with general counsel of large beverage company (“[I]f you want to work 
with us don’t work with them.”). 
 85. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF U.S., supra note 59, at 4.  This term refers to “cases in 
which the other party is the borrower or a provider of subordinated financing or other 
financing having rights to payment, collateral or voting other than on a pari passu basis in 
the proposed Ex-Im Bank Financing.” Id. 
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and gas companies have less stringent policies.86
To be sure, conflict rules are at the core of the lawyer–client relationship 
and have always been central in lawyers’ ethics.  The issue here is the 
growing control of corporate clients in delineating the scope of 
representational restrictions deriving from conflicts, as they define them. 
  He noted that law firms 
have lost business not due to professional rules, but rather to clients’ stricter 
rules on conflicts.  In sum, we see that conflicts of interest receive much 
attention in the lawyer–corporate client relationship. 
A similar process occurs with respect to confidentiality requirements, 
which are regularly included in OC Guidelines.87  In this context, it is worth 
noting requirement:  first, “information security” prerequisites that clients 
impose on lawyers (usually before they are retained).88  One interviewee 
noted that bank clients wanted to check the security of confidential bank 
information on law firm computers and systems—and did so via on-site 
audits.  The second is binding OC to specific confidentiality and privacy 
requirements of clients, such as bank privacy laws89 (such as the U.S. 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).90
 
 86. Interview with London law firm partner (Aug. 2011). 
 
 87. See, e.g., BANK OF AMERICA, supra note 74, at 4 (requiring OC to “follow all 
statutory and regulatory provisions relating to privacy, confidentiality and nondisclosure of 
customer records, proprietary information of Bank of America, and other privileged or 
confidential information, including without limitation information or data protection laws 
and regulations”). 
 88. Bank of America, for example, obligates its OC to  
use procedures and systems designed to (1) ensure the security, integrity and 
confidentiality of Bank of America proprietary and customer information; (2) 
protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such 
information; (3) protect against unauthorized access to or use of such information 
that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to Bank of America or any 
person that is the subject of such information; and (4) ensure the proper disposal of 
such information.  
Id. at 18.  
 89. See, e.g., Wachovia, supra note 60 (“Outside Counsel is expected to ensure that non-
public, proprietary and/or confidential information is protected and is not used or 
communicated in violation of banking, securities, or other applicable laws and regulations, 
or contrary to any applicable agreements or ethical standards.  For example, the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act imposes restrictions on the disclosure of non-public personal information 
by financial institutions and on recipients of such information from financial institutions and 
imposes certain information security obligations on financial institutions.”). 
 90. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).  The D.C. Circuit has 
ruled that lawyers are not “financial institutions” under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, thus 
they are not obligated to comply with the law’s privacy obligations. ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d 
457, 470–71 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  However, lawyers are likely to be regarded as “service 
providers” when they represent financial institutions, and may be required to provide 
contractual assurances about their information security practices and, in particular, the steps 
they are taking to protect any personal information they may acquire in the course of their 
representation. See Peter Mucklestone & Stuart Louie, Lawyers as “Service Providers” 
Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, PRIVACY & SEC. L. BLOG (Jun. 8, 2006), 
http://www.privsecblog.com/2006/06/articles/financial-institutions/lawyers-as-service-
providers-under-the-grammleachbliley-act/. 
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H.  Compliance with Specific Laws that Bind Lawyers and/or Clients 
Some OC Guidelines (as well as procurement documents) include 
explicit reference to legislation that applies to the corporation and/or to 
lawyers.  The most frequent reference is to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act91—
corporate obligations as well as lawyers’ “up the ladder” reporting duties.92  
Wachovia, for example, incorporates within its guidelines a reporting duty 
that exists in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.93  Other OC Guidelines require that 
the firm abide by legislation and regulation regarding corruption94 and 
“abusive tax shelters.”95  In accordance with a policy of this sort, a large 
Israeli law firm has been required to provide a written acknowledgement to 
its client that it will not “pay, offer, or promise to pay or authorize the 
payment directly or indirectly [of ] . . . anything of value to any government 
official . . . political party . . . candidate for political office for the purpose 
of inducing or rewarding favourable action . . . in any commercial 
transaction or in any governmental matter.”96
I.  General Ethical Duties, Duties Toward Third Parties, Gatekeeping, 
and Whistleblowing 
 
In interviews and some OC Guidelines, we came across instructions that 
appear to be concerned with interests other than those of the client.  To 
begin with, some general guidelines ask suppliers (lawyers included) to 
adhere to universal principles, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.97  Others demand lawyers’ adherence to “highest ethical 
standards.”98
 
 91. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
  However, there are a number of corporations that attend 
 92. See infra Part III.I. 
 93. See Wachovia, supra note 60 (“Wachovia is also committed to conducting its 
business in accordance with the highest ethical standards. . . .  If Outside Counsel reasonably 
believes that a material violation of law may have occurred, is occurring or is about to occur 
at or involving Wachovia, as set forth in Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and 
the SEC Rules promulgated thereunder . . . Outside Counsel must immediately and 
confidentially contact a Deputy General Counsel or Wachovia’s General Counsel and the 
responsible Legal Division Lawyer.”). 
 94. The Export-Import Bank of the United States, for example, clarifies its commitment 
to adherence to anti-corruption laws. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and Other 
Anti-bribery Measures, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK U.S., http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/
ForeignCorruptPracticesActFCPAandAnti-briberyMeasures.cfm (last updated July 23, 
2010). 
 95. See BANK OF AMERICA, supra note 74, at 18. 
 96. Interview with law firm compliance officer (Apr. 2011). 
 97. See Statement of Principles on Human Rights, GE (2009), http://www.ge.com/files_
citizenship/pdf/ge_statement_principles_human_rights.pdf (“GE, as a business enterprise, 
promotes the advancement of fundamental human rights.  We support the principles 
contained in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, remaining mindful that it is 
primarily addressed to nations.  GE has joined with other companies to find practical ways of 
applying within the business community the broad principles established in the 
Declaration.”); see also APPLE, supra note 72, at 1 (“Suppliers must uphold the human rights 
of workers, and treat them with dignity and respect as understood by the international 
community.”). 
 98. See BANK OF AMERICA, supra note 74, at 10. 
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specifically to lawyers’ professional conduct.  The most prominent are 
directives contending with “over-zealous” adversarial representation, as 
well as duties to the justice system and to the adversary during litigation. 
Some corporations (though not many) have specific litigation guidelines 
that limit lawyers’ “legal toolkit.”  No doubt Walmart has the most far-
reaching instructions to its OC,99
Many corporations demand that lawyers representing them utilize ADR 
measures, strive to achieve settlements, assess the case to see the strength of 
defense and decide on strategy accordingly, and generally manage cases in 
a way that is both more conciliatory and cost-effective.
 but other corporations also direct lawyers 
to not use “coercive, dilatory or obstructive tactics” and discourage 
protracted motion practice. 
100  These dual goals 
are not contradictory.  Walmart’s past reputation as a business that 
contested and aggressively disputed every claim not only resulted in a 
reputational loss, but was also an enormous financial burden; thus a more 
conciliatory and less aggressive stance might serve both interests.101
Finally, some corporations impose upon their outside lawyers’ direct 
“gatekeeping” requirements when they encounter improper behavior of 
corporate officers or staff.  Walmart expects its OC to go beyond that 
standard, stating under “Ethical Conduct” instructions: 
 
If Outside Counsel believes that a Walmart associate (including any Legal 
Department personnel) has or will engage in illegal or unethical activity 
as a representative or agent of the Company, that person must 
immediately and confidentially contact the [Responsible Legal 
Department Attorney (RLDA)] (or a Walmart Associate General Counsel-
Section Head or General Counsel, as appropriate).  No Walmart Associate 
has the authority to instruct Outside Counsel to act in an unethical manner 
in connection with any Walmart matter.102
In other words, OC are being used as a mechanism to monitor improper 
behavior of the client’s agents, turning them into “lawyers–gatekeepers.” 
 
Whether guidelines of this sort aim to achieve more efficient and cost 
effective management of caseload, their mere existence is novel and quite 
an astounding development.  They represent a set of practices that seems to 
stand in contrast with the recognized and often infamous professional 
 
 99. See infra Part IV. 
 100. See Bank of America, Fannie Mae, Universal Underwriters Group, Wachovia Group, 
Walmart, Zurich Insurance, The Export-Import Bank of America, infra Appendix. 
 101. See, e.g., Zurich, LITIGATION MANAGEMENT:  GUIDELINES FOR DEFENCE COUNSEL  3, 
available at http://www.zurich.com/NR/rdonlyres/E4145DF3-23EF-48CC-93A6-07D10F1
B791F/0/LMG.pdf (“Zurich expects to work with defence counsel and its insureds to 
achieve the best result for the insured in an efficient and cost-conscious manner consistent 
with the law firm’s ethical obligations.  Nothing contained herein is intended to nor shall 
restrict counsel’s exercise of independent professional judgment in rendering legal services 
for the insured or otherwise interfere with any ethical directive governing the conduct of 
counsel.”). 
 102. WAL-MART STORES INC., OUTSIDE COUNSEL GUIDELINES (U.S. FIRMS) 15 (2010) (on 
file with authors) [hereinafter WALMART GUIDELINES]. 
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culture of zealous, adversarial representation, and thus take part in shaping 
an alternative professional ethos and normative ethical landscape. 
J.  Diversity and Work–Life Balance Requirements 
A large number of corporations require OC to include women and 
minorities in the staff providing legal services; some also refer to “social 
background.”103
is committed to making diversity a competitive advantage within our 
organization by, among other things, ensuring that our internal workforce 
and the outside lawyers working on our matters reflect the diverse 
community that is our consumer base . . . .  Law firm partners will also be 
expected to provide periodic reporting . . . evidencing progress in 
alignment to the Company’s diversity goals.
  During procurement procedures, firms are to provide 
information on staff makeup, as well as policies relating to diversity.  
Diversity is conceptualized not just as the right thing to do, but also as a 
sound business strategy.  As the general counsel of a multinational retailer 
corporation explained, its Legal Division  
104
Some corporations are satisfied with their OC making a good faith effort to 
recruit, retain, and promote qualified women and minorities; others require 
a detailed report on these efforts, or impose an even stricter requirement 
that the list of Relationship Partner candidates includes a designated 
number of women, minorities, and partners on flex-time.
   
105
It seems that diversity requirements are becoming one of the standard 
terms of engagement.  In 2011, Walmart accompanied its Diversity 
Guidelines with “flex-time” requirements.
 
106  The rationale for adding this 
condition was that women and minorities are often at a disadvantage when 
working hours are long and inflexible;107
IV.  WALMART 
 it is also possible that lawyers 
who are not overworked can provide a better service. 
Walmart is an important source of work for OC; as of 2009, it used about 
680 outside law firms, both large and small.108
 
 103. Interview with London law firm partner, supra note 
  Walmart itself has thirteen 
different legal divisions, all with their own budgets and financial 
accountability.  They cover areas such as real estate, international affairs, 
Sam’s Club (a chain of membership-only retail warehouse clubs owned and 
operated by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.), corporate affairs and government, 
54 (social background is a 
requirement imposed by Morgan Stanley upon its OC). 
 104. Interview with general counsel (June 13, 2011). 
 105. The benefit that this has for candidates is reinforced by a requirement (which is 
monitored) that the RP receive all credit for the work brought into the firm. See infra note 
130 and accompanying text. 
 106. See infra Part IV.A.2; cf. Interview with personnel at London law firm (Sept. 2011) 
(stating that they have encountered requirements under which associates must not work more 
than ten hours a day). 
 107. See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Meredith Hobbs, On the Same Page, LEGAL WK., Apr. 21, 2011, at 14. 
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litigation, and class actions.  The Walmart OC Guidelines therefore provide 
a means of managing these diverse relationships efficiently and with as 
much specificity as possible.   
The Guidelines also may be seeking to address a reputation that Walmart 
wishes to change.  Walmart had a reputation for aggressively pursuing 
litigation even when it would have been cheaper to settle.  In 1999, Judge 
James Mehaffy accused Walmart of “thwarting, obfuscating and 
obstructing” court procedure, and threatened to fine Walmart $18 million 
for withholding an internal study of parking lot security sought by a woman 
who was abducted from a Walmart parking lot.109  The corporation also had 
a “long history of refusing to negotiate with plaintiffs” as well as a policy of 
“scrimping on legal costs.”110
However, these policies appear to have changed dramatically following 
the appointment of more experienced in-house lawyers.
 
111  The changes are 
reflected in Walmart’s OC Guidelines, which were revised most recently in 
2010.  They “supersede previously issued guidelines”112 and are one of the 
longest and most exhaustive sets of guidelines we came across in our 
research.  The new Guidelines were designed to be more user-friendly, 
increase efficiencies, reduce costs, and raise the level of the diversity 
initiatives.  They now comprise three parts:  a thirty-three-page set of 
guidelines; a sixteen-page Invoicing Addendum; and two Appendices 
which run for forty-seven pages.113
The Guidelines “set forth the expectations [Walmart] has of its outside 
law firms and define an effective working relationship with Walmart.  All 
attorneys and professional staff who work on matters for Walmart must be 
familiar with these Guidelines . . . .  [They] constitute the terms under 
which Outside Counsel are engaged.”
 
114  The contents reveal the very 
broad coverage of the Guidelines.  They include sections on diversity and 
flex-time, engaging OC, Wal-Mart’s relationship partner, conflicts of 
interest, staffing, confidentiality, ethical conduct, malpractice insurance, file 
retention, e-mail, information security, media contact, gifts and gratuities, 
evaluation and feedback, audits, managing litigation, pleadings and 
motions, discovery, settlement and ADR, filing appeals, managing non-
litigation matters, and invoicing for fees and expenses.115
The expectations of OC are set out in general terms at the beginning: 
  The latter is 
supplemented by the Invoicing Addendum. 
Walmart expects . . . Outside Counsel . . . to provide the Company with 
the highest quality legal services in the most cost-effective manner 
possible.  We expect Outside Counsel to stress integrity, professionalism, 
 
 109. Richard Willing, Lawsuits Follow Growth Curve of Wal-Mart, USA TODAY, Aug. 
14, 2001, at A1. 
 110. DeMott, supra note 40, at 972–73 (quoting Catherine Aman & Gary Young, Wal-
Mart Shifting Litigation Strategy, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 30, 2002, at A29). 
 111. Id. at 974. 
 112. WALMART GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 6. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 2–5. 
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a sense of urgency in resolving legal problems, and sensitivity to 
protecting and honoring the three fundamental principles that have 
contributed to our success:  respect for the individual, service to our 
customers and a constant striving for excellence.116
OC are also expected to demonstrate commitment to diversity, including 
honoring flexible work schedules, responsiveness and timely 
communication with in-house attorneys, working knowledge of Walmart’s 
business and legal goals, and compliance with OC Guidelines.
   
117
OC are also entitled to expectations of Walmart’s behavior.  They can 
expect from Walmart, among other things:  cooperation with OC, feedback, 
a commitment to professionalism and integrity in working with OC, 
demonstration of Walmart’s three basic beliefs, working knowledge of 
Walmart’s business and legal goals, demonstrated commitment to diversity, 
including honoring flexible work schedules, and compliance with OC 
Guidelines.
 
118
There are two features of the Guidelines that are particularly significant.  
The first is related to requirements regarding operational aspects of the OC 
firm, which include guidelines relating to diversity, flex-time, and 
Relational Partners.  The second addresses Outside Counsel’s conduct 
during professional activity.  We will look at each in turn. 
 
A.  Law Firm Operation 
1.  Diversity 
The commitment to diversity “both internally and in its [OC] hiring 
practices” appears to go far beyond mere rhetoric.119  As the Guidelines put 
it, “Diversity is not just about doing the right thing,” it is in Walmart’s own 
interest:  “we believe that a culturally sensitive, diverse workplace is better 
able to serve our needs and produce better results.”120
This belief is followed by a series of detailed requirements:  law firm 
diversity is measured by “[o]verall law firm demographics,” 
“[d]emographics of the firm’s Walmart team,” and “[g]ood-faith efforts 
exhibited by the firm.”
 
121  The latter is defined as including “[h]aving an 
active diversity committee,” “[i]mplementing a diversity plan,” “[a]ttending 
and sponsoring diversity events,” “[i]ncreasing efforts to develop and retain 
women and minority attorneys,” and “[i]nvesting in the future of the 
profession (e.g., pipeline efforts).”122
 
 116. Id. at 6. 
  Walmart “encourages Outside 
 117. Id. at 7. 
 118. Id. at 7–8. 
 119. Id. at 7. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 8. 
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Counsel to utilize qualified diverse attorneys as appropriate when staffing 
Walmart matters.”123
2.  Flex-Time 
 
Walmart Guidelines state, “[W]e are equally committed to promoting 
balanced work arrangements, as set out in our internal Flex-Time 
Policy.”124
Flex-time was first introduced within Walmart before becoming a 
requirement for OC in the 2010 Guidelines.
  Under this policy, attorneys should be allowed to work a 
flexible or reduced-hours schedule, work from home, or job share. 
125  The development may have 
been influenced by the National Association of Women Lawyers survey, 
which highlighted the challenges women, especially women of color, face 
to advance their careers in the legal profession.126
 Balanced work schedules for attorneys are part of the business case for 
diversity at Walmart and we believe they will come to matter more and 
more to other large consumers of legal services for a number of reasons.  
First, attrition rates in large law firms, even in good economic times, are 
upwards of 20%—more than double those in most industries.  The loss of 
a talented associate or partner due to the absence of balanced work 
arrangements results in lost institutional knowledge from both a firm and 
client perspective.  This is not only disruptive to the continuity of work, it 
is also expensive—both to the law firm losing the attorneys and to the 
clients to whom the firm passes on those costs. 
  The implementation of 
flex-time followed the participation of Jeff Gearhart, Walmart’s Executive 
Vice President and General Counsel, in the Project for Attorney Retention’s 
Annual Diversity and Flexibility Connection Conference: 
 Moreover, the absence of flex-time arrangements has been shown to 
have seriously detrimental effect on the careers of women and minorities.  
In fact, minority female lawyers have the highest attrition rate of any 
group of lawyers and we are beginning to understand that a lack of 
work/life balance may play a major role for many of these attorneys.127
Many law firms used by Walmart are small, two- to three-partner firms 
providing localized services and local counsel in areas such as land use, 
casualty, and tort.  In these firms, a flex-time requirement is fairly 
redundant.  However, many of the large firms that Walmart uses might be 
reluctant to introduce flexible working time because of billable hour 
 
 
 123. Id. at 14.  For more on Walmart’s diversity efforts, see Sheri Qualters, Flextime 
Among the New Criteria for Clients’ Evaluation of Law Firms, LAW.COM (Oct. 27, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202434954310. 
 124. WALMART GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 8. 
 125. Walmart Announces Flex-Time Requirements for Outside Law Firms, WALMART 
LEGAL NEWS 1, 2 (Nov. 2009), http://walmartlegal.rfi-walmart.com/WalmartLegal-
Newsletter.pdf. 
 126. See NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, REPORT OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF THE PROMOTION AND RETENTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS (Oct. 2009), available 
at http://nawl.timberlakepublishing.com/files/2009%20Survey%20Report%20FINAL.pdf. 
 127. WALMART LEGAL NEWS, supra note 125, at 1. 
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requirements and other pressures.  Walmart therefore may be able to 
influence a different approach to this work-life balance issue. 
Flexible schedules may be in the interests of Walmart as well as of those 
individuals who benefit from them, another example of enlightened self-
interest:  “We believe such arrangements promote attorney retention, 
facilitate the implementation of alternative-fee arrangements, and create a 
more balanced work environment.”128
In the recent Guidelines, Walmart set a deadline of February 1, 2011 for 
firms to implement flex-time policies that the law firm deems appropriate 
for the firm and its U.S.-based attorneys.
  They also prevent the loss of 
institutional knowledge and create a more balanced and inclusive work 
environment. 
129  It threatened to terminate its 
relationship with any firm that did not implement such a policy, unless the 
firm communicated “an acceptable reason why the implementation of such 
a policy is not practical.”130
3.  Relationship Partners 
 
The significance of these diversity and flex-time commitments is 
reinforced by Walmart’s requirements regarding Relationship Partners 
(RPs) and the way they are chosen.  The RP is the primary contact at the 
law firm and manages the relationship.  Walmart relies on its RPs, who are 
responsible for compliance with the Guidelines.131  The RP’s duties include 
“[t]aking demonstrable steps to advance diversity” and “monitoring and 
advising on conflicts of interest.”132
The OC firm must produce a list of five possible RPs, which “must 
contain at least one attorney of color, at least one female attorney, and at 
least one attorney who works on a flexible work schedule, provided the firm 
has at least one such attorney.”
 
133
The significance of this is enhanced by Walmart’s requirement that the 
Walmart RP shall receive full “Origination Credit” for all Walmart work 
coming into the firm.  This requirement is enforced by Walmart demanding, 
from a senior member of the firm, a certificate that the RP has received or 
will receive the credit.  This is known as Origin Credit Certification,
  Given that it has historically been more 
difficult for women and minorities to develop large and sustained books of 
business, when compared with their white male counterparts, the Walmart 
OC Guidelines address the lack of equal opportunity within the legal 
profession. 
134
 
 128. WALMART GUIDELINES, supra note 
 and 
is a substantial incursion into the internal affairs of the law firm. 
102, at 8. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 9. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 10. 
 134. Id. (The firm “shall annually certify in writing on or before January 31 of each year 
that the Walmart [RP has] received or will receive full credit for all Walmart work brought 
into the firm in the preceding twelve-month period and that no such work was disseminated 
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This requirement reflects the fact that the Walmart legal department 
understands the way law firms reward their partners.  The “coin of the 
realm” in law firms depends upon who has the relationship with the client.  
Many of the large law firms have numerous corporate clients.  Walmart 
believes that this credit requirement helps convert the rhetoric of diversity 
and flex-time into a reality. 
B.  Professional Conduct 
1.  Ethical Conduct 
The second highly significant area of interest in the Guidelines concerns 
the ethical standards required of OC.  Once again, as with so many of the 
OC Guidelines, there appears to be a degree of high “rhetoric.”  But here, 
too, there is also some attempt to make these a reality. 
The rhetoric in the introduction to the Guidelines is repeated later on in 
the section on Ethical Standards:  “Walmart conducts its business in 
accordance with the highest ethical standards and expects the same of its 
[OC].”135  Furthermore, “[a]ll OC are required to adhere to Walmart’s 
Statement of Ethics.”136
To begin with, Walmart includes a broad definition of circumstances in 
which a conflict of interest arises.  The OC Guidelines prohibit OC from 
representing Walmart in any matter in which a conflict of interest exists, 
and includes not only actual, potential, or other conflicts as defined by any 
applicable code of professional responsibility or rules of professional 
conduct.  It broadens conflict of interest to include whatever Walmart may 
conclude is a conflict of interest, “if Outside Counsel represents a 
significant competitor.”
  However, there are many more specific 
requirements, some of which reinforce or expand upon ABA Model Rules. 
137
However, ethics are not confined to the traditional topics included in 
ethical codes.  The OC Guidelines incorporate matters that are usually 
regulated by the state.  For example, OC are required by Walmart to report 
illegal or unethical activity.
 
138  In those circumstances, there is a duty to 
immediately and confidentially contact authorized personnel at Walmart.139
In addition, when it comes to representing Walmart in litigation, the 
Guidelines go from broad aspiration into great detail, and instruct OC to: 
   
 
within the firm without the knowledge and consent of the Walmart [RP].  Such certification 
shall be provided by the firm’s Chairperson, Managing Partner, General Counsel, Chief 
Financial Officer, or other such person in a position of firm leadership.  In no instances shall 
the Walmart [RP] be required to provide the aforementioned certification.”). 
 135. Id. at 15. 
 136. Id.; see also WALMART STATEMENT OF ETHICS (rev. Sept. 2008), available at 
http://walmartstores.com/media/cdnpull/statementofethics/pdf/U.S_SOE.pdf. 
 137. WALMART GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 11. 
 138. See id. at 15. 
 139. Id. (reporting should be made to the “AGC-OCM (or a Walmart Associate General 
Counsel–Section Head or General Counsel, as appropriate)”). 
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Honor the spirit, intent, and requirements of all rules of civil procedure 
and rules of professional conduct 
Conduct themselves in a manner that enhances and preserves the dignity 
and integrity of the system of justice 
Adhere to the principles and rules of conduct that further the truth-seeking 
process so that disputes will be resolved in a just, dignified, courteous, 
and efficient manner 
Make reasonable responses to discovery requests and not interpret them in 
an artificially restrictive manner so as to avoid disclosure of relevant and 
non-privileged information . . . 
Make good faith efforts to resolve disputes concerning pleadings and 
discovery 
Agree to reasonable requests for extension of time and waiver of 
procedural formalities when doing so will not adversely affect Walmart’s 
legitimate rights 
Prepare and submit discovery requests that are limited to those requests 
reasonably necessary for the prosecution or defense of an action and not 
for the purpose of placing an undue burden or expense on another 
party.140
Although some of these guidelines are open to interpretation and clearly 
require the exercise of professional judgment, the sanction for failing to 
adhere to these standards is set out in no uncertain terms:  “Walmart will 
terminate its relationship . . . .”
 
141
2.  Discovery Proceedings 
 
Historically, Walmart had a reputation for being sanctioned for 
discovery-related issues.  This reputation may have been the result of 
unethical behavior, but it is also possible that the company was simply 
inundated with discovery requests and, as a result, found it difficult to keep 
up with them.  Walmart reported that it had been sued 4,851 times in the 
year 2000, or once every two hours; juries decided a case in which Walmart 
was a defendant about six times every business day; and Walmart lawyers 
listed 9,400 open cases.142
This probably explains why, about five years ago, Walmart established a 
Litigation Support Group, within the Litigation Group, with the sole task of 
processing discovery requests.
 
143  As one interviewee put it, the “whole 
philosophy has changed—we do care if we are sanctioned.”144
The Discovery section goes into some detail: 
  Since 2008, 
no firm has been terminated because of discovery sanctions. 
 
 140. Id. at 18. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Willing, supra note 109. 
 143. Compare, for example, that in the United Kingdom, Herbert Smith “outsourced” the 
management of all its discovery work to Belfast, Northern Ireland. David Gold, Litigators 
Must Adapt to New Practices or Perish, THE TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, at 63. 
 144. Interview with general counsel, supra note 104. 
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Form objections [to discovery requests] are to be avoided.  All objections 
must fully articulate the legal and factual basis for the objection. . . . 
Outside Counsel are expected to make informed, ethical decisions with 
respect to discovery responses . . . .  [and] are required to conduct 
discovery in a manner that enhances and preserves the dignity and 
integrity of the justice system.  Under no circumstances shall Outside 
Counsel engage in or encourage a violation of any discovery or ethical 
rule concerning the timely and appropriate disclosure of information to 
which a litigant is entitled. . . . 
Sanctions for discovery violations will not be tolerated and may result in 
the immediate termination of Outside Counsel.145
These standards were unchanged from the earlier Guidelines.  However, the 
2010 Guidelines require OC to report significant developments involving 
“[a]ny orders granting such discovery motions or awarding sanctions.”
 
146
3.  Settlement and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
A fourth area of significance is the section on settlement and ADR:  
“Walmart encourages early settlement discussions when the settlement of a 
litigated matter is ‘the right thing to do’ under the circumstances.”147  It 
encourages the use of ADR:  “Outside Counsel should proactively identify 
and bring to the attention of the PIC all opportunities to utilize ADR.”148
4.  Monitoring Performance 
 
Ongoing relationships with OC are developed, and OC performance is 
monitored, in a number of ways.  The in-house lawyers within the various 
divisions who are responsible for sending work to OC have fairly regular 
contact.  Walmart also has an Office of OC Management which may also 
have contact with OC.  In addition, every other year, Walmart holds a two-
day OC conference.  The CEO and General Counsel attend the first day, 
during which Walmart’s expectations—as well as feedback from OC—are 
presented.  On the second day, there are smaller sessions within each 
specialist subject area.149
The Walmart Guidelines are probably the most exhaustive that we have 
come across.  We have been told that relationships with particular law firms 
have been terminated under the Guidelines.  The most common reason for 
termination has been “ethical lapses” by OC.  The current view of Walmart 
is that the company cannot afford any sort of taint from an ethical 
standpoint.  It wants to avoid being sanctioned for tactical as well as 
 
 
 145. WALMART GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 22–23. 
 146. Id. at 19. 
 147. Id. at 24. 
 148. Id. at 25. 
 149. Walmart OC Guidelines serve as a training model for the Association of Corporate 
Counsel. See, e.g., Value Practice:  Walmart Performance Evaluation, ASS’N CORP. 
COUNSEL, http://www.acc.com/legalresources/resource.cfm?show=39926 (last visited Apr. 
21, 2012). 
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reputational reasons.  Therefore, where OC fall short of the ethical 
standards expected, even if the sanctions received by OC are unrelated to 
Walmart representation, the relationship with the firm will be limited or 
even terminated.  In addition, firms have been terminated because they did 
not adapt as quickly as Walmart required to the diversity expectations. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Lawyers’ ethical judgments are typically made in private and are 
unobservable.  The opportunities for external monitoring by regulators are 
limited.  It is no wonder that professional codes and external regulation play 
such a small part in the lives of large firm lawyers.  Failures are rarely 
identified until things have gone seriously wrong.150  This is why some 
scholars call for lawyers to exercise their “professional conscience”151 or to 
act in a self-aware manner with integrity152
However, other scholars question whether this is realistic, at least with 
respect to ethics in large law firms, since “[c]onsulting an internal moral 
compass is foreign to the large firm lawyers’ habit of mind.”
 when making ethical choices. 
153  Similarly, 
the “rush to judgment” of lawyers’ conduct that routinely follows major 
“crises”154 in the legal profession also mostly ignores the context of 
corporate legal practice.155
Lessons can be learned from the Enron case:  not only did Enron’s 
general counsel consider his in-house legal department to be a “‘world-
class’ in-house law firm,”
  These limitations apply across the ethical 
landscape:  when client interests are at stake—and, more critically, when 
lawyers need to balance client interests with the public interest. 
156  Enron was also advised by Arthur Andersen, 
then one of the “Big 5” accounting firms, and overseen by a “top-notch” 
board of directors.157
 
 150. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK:  LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008) (detailing ethics cases brought against lawyers); W.H. 
Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair:  The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the Bar’s Temptations 
of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998) (discussing the Kaye Scholer 
ethics case). 
  Most experts believed that Enron had “a state of the 
 151. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L REV. 1, 21–22 (2005). 
 152. See Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of Integrity, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1629 (2002). 
 153. See, e.g., Kimberley Kirkland, Ethics in Large Firms:  The Principle of Pragmatism, 
35 U. MEM. L. REV. 631, 729–30 (2005). 
 154. See, e.g., ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS, supra note 48; Eli Wald, Lawyers 
and Corporate Scandals, 7 LEGAL ETHICS 54, 59 (2004). 
 155. Whelan, supra note 47, at 1067–68. 
 156. Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-
16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 4, 2003), app. C, at 15.  Enron had 250 attorneys most of 
whom had between eight and seventeen years of legal experience when they joined. Id. at 16. 
 157. The directors reflected a wide range of business, finance, accounting, and 
government experience and included “a group of men and women who were highly 
successful in their professional careers.” Final Report of Neal Batson, supra note 156, at 56–
57; see also Whelan, supra note 47, at 1098. 
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art Code of Conduct.”158  No wonder outside counsel, dealing with 
complex transactions on the direction of such a sophisticated client 
ultimately deferred to in-house counsel and to Enron itself, even when there 
was concern about some of the legal ramifications.159  Thus prospects that 
lawyers could act as “gatekeepers” on behalf of the public, and become 
watchdogs and whistleblowers of their clients, seem a long way off in 
practice.160  It is unlikely that the changes in legal education so often 
prompted by such crises will change things either.161
The privatizing of professionalism may therefore offer a new method 
with additional tools for the effective monitoring of lawyer ethical conduct.  
External regulators cannot effectively monitor the behavior of individual 
lawyers or law firms, but corporate clients can.  Not only can clients, 
especially in-house counsel, monitor lawyer conduct directly and indirectly, 
they have the leverage to direct and to manage particular behavior.  Our 
research suggests that this is what many corporate clients actually do. 
 
The division of function between barristers and solicitors in England 
presents a basis for comparison.  Just as the barrister is instructed and 
monitored by the sophisticated “professional client”—the solicitor—OC 
work can be monitored by in-house counsel.  The barrister knows that the 
work will be assessed and evaluated by someone who knows what should 
be done and what could have been done by the barrister.  The same is true 
for OC.  Unlike the individual client–lawyer relationship, there is no 
informational asymmetry preventing assessment by the client of the quality 
of legal service.162  Clients of global law firms are “expert buyers of legal 
services;”163
In addition, in-house lawyers have a close relationship with their OC; 
they are repeat players.
 large corporate clients are very sophisticated when it comes to 
telling OC what they want. 
164  Moreover, pressures on OC to deviate from 
ethical norms, which may come from lay officers of the corporate client, 
may be diluted by intermediary in-house lawyers.165
 
 158. Jennifer Schaller, Almost Ten Years After the Enron Meltdown:  More Costs, More 
Prosecution, More Compliance?, NAT’L L. REV. (July 7, 2010), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/almost-ten-years-after-enron-meltdown-more-costs-
more-prosecution-more-compliance. 
  In short, they are in a 
 159. Whelan, supra note 47, at 1096–99. 
 160. Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest?  Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 129, 132 (2011); Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market:  The Evolving Role 
of Business Lawyers, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1106–07 (2005). 
 161. Arnold Rochvarg, Enron, Watergate and the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 43 
WASHBURN L.J. 61, 67, 88–90 (2004). 
 162. C.G. Veljanovski & C.J. Whelan, Professional Negligence and the Quality of Legal 
Services—An Economic Perspective, 46 MOD. L. REV. 700, 704–05 (1983). 
 163. Alexia Garamfalvi, England Poised to Reform Legal Market, LAW.COM (Aug. 10, 
2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1155114327477 (quoting 
Brian McDonnell, an associate with the London office of Hunton & Williams). 
 164. As many as twenty Vinson & Elkins lawyers joined Enron’s in-house legal 
department, including a former partner, James Derrick, Enron’s general counsel since 1991. 
Brenda Sapnio Jeffreys, V&E Closes Book on Enron, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 11, 2002, at 16. 
 165. Kim, supra note 44, at 1001–26. 
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unique institutional position to impose, monitor, and enforce ethical 
standards. 
Large firm and global lawyers also face the reality of “double 
deontology,” the fact that ethical conduct rules vary between different 
jurisdictions.  Practitioners may have to be aware of and abide by local 
rules.  Even within single jurisdictions, the days of requiring all lawyers to 
adhere to the same professional code—despite the multiplicity and diversity 
of legal practice and practitioners—may be over.166
However, privatizing professional responsibility promises even more 
than this.  Scholars have emphasized the need for an “ethical infrastructure” 
in law firms.
  Privatizing 
professionalism enables clients to set their own standards and make sure 
their lawyers abide by a single set of standards, no matter where they 
practice. 
167  Large corporate clients and their in-house legal teams can, 
via OC procedures, force firms to create such an infrastructure.168
Some of the in-house general counsel we interviewed stated that part of 
the rationale for imposing ethical obligations on their OC was that they 
knew exactly what the realities were in large firm practice.  They knew 
about the pressures on associates in terms of work-life balance, billing, the 
desire to make partner, and so on.  The pressures to deviate from ethical 
conduct in the name of making profits and bringing in business included, 
according to a “big firm” partner in Australia, “inflating time sheets, 
undertaking such unnecessary research, exaggerating the need to review 
everything during discovery, undertaking overzealous due diligence 
processes, and other practices.”
  We have 
seen that special committees have had to be formed, new systems of 
monitoring have been introduced, certification and reporting requirements 
have been imposed.  One firm has even been subjected to inspection and 
on-site audit.  In other words, OC procedures can influence the 
organizational structure and culture within law firms. 
169  He went on:  “[W]e cheat and lie to 
make ends meet.  We act dishonestly as a matter of course.  We do it 
because we have no choice.”170  It is not surprising that increasing 
bureaucratization within large firms and the existing criteria for personal 
lawyer success is a threat to traditional notions of professionalism.171
 
 166. Andrew M. Francis, Legal Ethics, the Marketplace and the Fragmentation of Legal 
Professionalism, 12 INT’L J. LEG. PROF. 173, 175 (2005). 
  With 
 167. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure 
in Large Law Firms:  A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 692 
(2002); Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems:  Reflections on How Law Influences the 
“Ethical Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 246 (1998). 
 168. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics 
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 559, 560–61 (2002); Anthony E. Davis, The Emergence of Law Firm General 
Counsel and the Challenges Ahead, 20 PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2010 at 1 (noting that there are 
very few large law firms that do not now have a full-time general counsel to manage the 
firm’s compliance with professional regulation). 
 169. EVANS, supra note 10, at 36–37. 
 170. Id. at 37. 
 171. Kirkland, supra note 153, at 730. 
2606 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
a picture as stark as this, perhaps privatizing professional responsibility is 
the only viable alternative for clients as well as the only way possible to 
achieve professionalism and ethical accountability. 
There are other reasons for OC Guidelines.  Large corporate clients are 
often concerned with protecting their reputations.172  The conduct of the 
lawyers they hire can adversely affect that reputation, hence the desire to 
police conduct.  Wilkins has noted that one of the benefits that corporations 
receive when they hire OC is “the legitimacy that lawyers receive by virtue 
of their status as officers of the legal system.”173  Clients also get the 
benefit of attorney-client privilege, something that in many parts of the 
world, in-house lawyers cannot offer.174
Another context for the transformation of professional responsibility via 
OC procedures is CSR, which is based on notions of community 
accountability.  There may be sound reasons for this.  Corporations, 
especially publicly held corporations, have a relatively high degree of 
public accountability.  They are subject to scrutiny in a variety of forums, 
from regulators, such as the SEC in the United States, to public interest 
groups worldwide.  Corporations are certainly more publicly accountable 
than private law firms, which are normally LLPs and owned by members of 
the firm.  And while law firms seek to create a positive public image, for 
example through their pro bono activities,
  It is no wonder that some of the 
procedures reinforce professional obligations to the system. 
175
Corporations have the resources and, possibly, the motivation to promote 
lawyers’ ethics alongside other social and community norms.  Their power 
to instigate positive as well as negative change should not be under-
estimated, as our study has shown.  More than traditional sources of 
professional regulation, corporations have the information and resources 
that other regulators lack.  Corporate “regulators” also have a power to 
control that is not necessarily constrained by concerns about legal 
legitimacy, democratic accountability, or rule-of-law rhetoric.  Of course, 
one must always be realistic and perhaps skeptical of OC procedures.  Just 
 the pressure on corporations is 
greater.  Thus, the in-house legal department at a publicly held corporation 
is likely to have a very different worldview than the private law firm.  They 
will be influenced by the culture in which they operate—one that is publicly 
accountable.  That may be why the questions being asked of corporations in 
a world of CSR—including questions about diversity and how the 
corporation is benefitting society—will be asked of the in-house legal 
department along with everybody else. 
 
 172. Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance:  Soft Law and Reputational 
Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 45 (2010). 
 173. Wilkins, supra note 45, at 2118. 
 174. See, e.g., Case C-550/07, Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Ltd. v. Comm’n (Sept. 14, 2010), 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=82839&page
Index=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1397857 (decision of the 
European Court of Justice). 
 175. One interviewee from a law firm welcomed the reporting requirements imposed on 
his firm regarding pro bono activities and diversity because “we can brag about ourselves.” 
Interview with London law firm partner, supra note 54. 
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as professional codes of conduct can be legitimately viewed as designed to 
achieve contradictory objectives—on the one hand, effective self-
regulation, high ideals, and real discipline with effective sanctions; on the 
other, an attempt to control the market or a sham—the same may be true of 
OC procedures.  However, we feel confident in claiming that many of the 
procedures are more than mere rhetoric,176
Like professional codes, OC procedures combine different types of 
obligations.  There are “principles” which call for professional judgment, 
such as the general directive to follow the highest ethical standards.  There 
are “standards,” which stress particular virtues, such as instruction 
prohibiting coercive, dilatory, or obstructive tactics in litigation.  Finally, 
there are “rules,” which prescribe specific conduct in much more detail, 
such as the rules on billing and conflicts of interest.  Achieving compliance 
with standards and principles is not impossible, but is much more difficult 
than with rules.  This is because “standards” and “principles” are, by their 
very nature, more vague and open to interpretation.  In practice, sanctions 
for non-compliance with professional codes, although theoretically possible 
in all cases, are in practice likely only when there is a breach of specific 
rules. 
 and in attributing to these 
procedures a significant impact on large law firms, which the firms 
themselves generally resent even if they sometimes also acknowledge their 
usefulness.  Indeed, OC procedures have a number of significant advantages 
over professional codes. 
Unlike professional codes, however,  the enforcement of all obligations 
in OC procedures can be much more effective.  This is because large 
corporate clients do not have to justify their decision to impose the ultimate 
sanction:  termination of the relationship.  A good example of this would be 
the rules on conflicts of interest to be found in both professional codes and 
OC procedures.  Rules on conflicts of interest require law firms to reject 
clients in many circumstances; the firms do not like these rules as a result.  
Indeed, London firms “have been notorious in seeking to circumvent them 
at times.”178F177  By contrast, not only are OC procedure provisions on 
conflicts generally wider in scope than professional codes, the threat of 
losing the client in the event of a breach can act as a much more powerful 
deterrent.  One interviewee called the conflict rules imposed by clients “a 
nightmare 178 
CONCLUSION 
Governance is concerned with the ways in which conduct and behavior 
can be monitored and regulated.  It can take many forms, both formal, such 
as through government and law, and informal, for example through 
communities or the market.  Corporations, however, can also constitute a 
 
 176. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done?  A Corporate Law Theory for 
Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 771 (2007) (“[C]orporate 
rhetoric has a greater connection to corporate behaviour than most would presume.”). 
 177. BOON & LEVIN, supra note 1, at 120. 
 178. Interview with London law firm partner, supra note 54. 
2608 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
form of governance, such as when they impose minimum labor or 
environmental standards through their supply chains.  As Ronen Shamir 
notes, with CSR, what researchers are “witnessing is not merely a 
transformation of the technologies of government but also an expansion and 
transformation of the very means of governing.”179  When corporate clients 
start regulating OC conduct, they are exercising governance.  OC 
procedures also constitute an expansion and transformation of the means of 
governing lawyers’ ethics.  This process reallocates power between state, 
markets, and civil society.  It affects the regulation of the legal profession, 
the lawyer-client relationship, and the structure of the legal services 
field.180
On the one hand, privatizing professionalism threatens the traditional 
professional mode of self-regulation, and calls into question the core 
professional value of lawyer independence.  In addition, the notion that 
corporate clients are determining the public responsibilities of private 
lawyers is initially unsettling.  Yet, the profession’s record of living up to 
its own public aspirations has been questionable.  What is emerging through 
OC procedures appears to be a blurring of lines between different modes of 
governance and the construction of a new interdependence among different 
governance structures.  But to the extent that professionalism has been 
privatized, it arguably has also been revived and enhanced.  While there 
may be self interest in OC procedures, this frequently incorporates visions 
of professionalism to which OC and their firms must adhere.  We have seen 
calls for lawyers to be “guardians of corporate ethical responsibility”;
 
181
 
 we 
did not expect to see corporations being guardians of lawyers’ ethical 
responsibility.  Yet privatizing professionalism appears to be the reality for 
large corporate clients.  It is therefore a form of regulation that needs to be 
included in any future theories of lawyer professionalism. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Comments 
 
Content Conflict of 
interest and 
confidentiality  
Billing  General approach 
to ethics 
Means of 
oversight 
Corporation 
 
Excerpt of contract referred by HFN, part of 
U.S. legislation regarding bribery of public 
officials 
HFN commits to nonpayment (bribery) of 
government officials 
HFN commits to 
notification if the 
lawyer takes 
official position 
that may affect 
client 
 
 No Contract with 
Israeli law firm 
HFN 
Anonymous 
client  
Not designed specifically for lawyers Includes workers and human rights, health 
& safety, environment, and ethics 
Yes No Yes, very broad Apple supplier 
Code of 
Conduct (2009) 
(General code) 
Apple 
Engagement of minorities & women as 
Outside Counsel 
Litigation:  Coercive, dilatory, or 
obstructive tactics not to be used; 
discourages protracted motion practice; 
early consideration of ADR and 
settlements 
Confidentiality, 
including the 
Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act;  
compliance with 
SOX, regulation 
regarding tax 
shelters 
 
Yes “Litigation 
Philosophy”:  Cost 
effectiveness; 
maintaining “highest 
ethical standards” 
 
Outside 
Counsel 
Procedures 
Bank of America 
Extremely detailed supervision over legal 
activities 
 Confidentiality 
and Conflicts 
(lists competitors) 
Yes None Partnership 
Guidelines for 
Matter 
Handling and 
Billing 
Practices for 
Outside 
Counsel 
 
Boston Scientific 
Corporation 
Although labeled as OC guideline, it refers 
only to litigation management in terms of cost 
reduction; no ethical reference 
 
 Only cost-control 
mechanisms 
Yes None Guidelines for 
Outside 
Counsel 
Del Monte 
Corporation 
APPENDIX 
 
Comments 
 
Content Conflict of 
interest and 
confidentiality  
Billing  General approach 
to ethics 
Means of 
oversight 
Corporation 
 
There is a selection process for OC; no explicit 
reference to lawyers as consultants; EBRD 
confined by UN resolutions and cannot 
transfer money if violates them; no mentioning 
of ethics in considering selection of providers 
 
Prohibition of coercive practice, collusive 
practice, corrupt practice, fraudulent 
practice  
General eligibility 
requirements 
 Observance of the 
highest standards of 
transparency and 
integrity 
Procurement 
Policy & Rules  
European Bank 
for 
Reconstruction & 
Development 
Letter relates to trial counsel handling 
foreclosure; FM retains full control of case 
handing 
 
Prefer negotiations, postpone sale if client 
cooperative 
None Yes None Engagement of 
counsel letter 
Fannie Mae 
May not use subcontracting and third parties to 
evade duties; no explicit reference to lawyers 
  
Highest ethical standards in terms of 
regulatory compliance, HR, labor, 
environment, business ethics, IP, trade, 
require honesty and fairness  
N/A  “Committed to 
unyielding Integrity 
and high standards of 
business conduct in 
everything we do, 
especially 
in our dealings with 
GE suppliers, 
contractors and 
consultants” 
 
The Spirit & 
the Letter; 
Integrity Guide 
for Suppliers, 
Contractors and 
Consultants 
General Electric 
(GE) 
All reference to litigation strategies (ADR, 
discovery, motions) as part of costs reduction 
and efficiency considerations 
 Conflict of 
interest  
Yes, cost 
effectiveness 
and 
excellence to 
be 
reconciled. 
Litigation to 
be resolved 
expeditiously
, using ADR. 
Legal 
motions & 
discovery to 
be reduced 
as a cost 
effective 
strategy (not 
philosophy) 
 
Affirmative action 
employer and 
encourages OC to 
adhere to such policies 
Outside 
Counsel manual 
Israeli Electronic 
Co. 
  None Yes None Billing 
guidelines for 
OC 
 
John Deere 
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Comments 
 
Content Conflict of 
interest and 
confidentiality  
Billing  General approach 
to ethics 
Means of 
oversight 
Corporation 
 
   Yes MCCCD hires OC 
based on firm’s 
expertise and high 
ethical standards 
 
Guidelines for 
Outside 
Counsel 
Maricopa County 
Community 
College District 
Diversity: “The Company expects that all of its 
vendors (including law firms) will leverage 
diversity as a business imperative. To this end, 
the Legal Division is committed to making 
diversity a competitive advantage within our 
organization by, among other things, ensuring 
that our internal workforce and the outside 
lawyers working on our matters reflect the 
diverse community that is our consumer 
base. . . . Law firm partners will also be 
expected to provide periodic reporting . . . 
evidencing progress in alignment to the 
Company’s diversity goals.” 
 
 Conflicts of 
interest 
Yes OC must maintain the 
highest ethical 
standards at all times 
and be in full 
compliance with the 
Company’s Code of 
Conduct 
 
Guidelines for 
Outside 
Counsel 
(June 1 2011) 
Multinational 
beverage 
Company 
Basic principles are costs and efficiency.  No 
reference to ethics, integrity, etc.  
 None Yes, strict None Guidelines for 
Stanford 
Outside 
Counsel 
 
Stanford 
University 
 Coercive, delaying, or obstructive tactics 
shall not be used 
Conflict of 
interest, 
confidentiality 
Yes Company requires 
outside counsel to 
comply with Rules of 
Professional Conduct 
and the highest ethical 
standards 
 
Policy 
Governing 
Retention of 
Outside 
Counsel 
 
State of 
Minnesota 
Relationship will be terminated if any OC fails 
to adhere to the ethical standards 
 
 
 Conflicts of 
interest, 
confidentiality 
(including 
confidentiality 
agreement), ADR 
 
Yes, in detail OC expected to 
represent State “with 
integrity, 
professionalism and a 
sense of urgency”; 
expects “the highest 
ethical standards” 
 
Outside 
Counsel 
Guidelines 
(2011) 
State of New 
Jersey 
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Comments 
 
Content Conflict of 
interest and 
confidentiality  
Billing  General approach 
to ethics 
Means of 
oversight 
Corporation 
 
Failure to comply with the Guidelines may 
result in termination and disqualification in the 
future 
 Conflict of 
interest, 
confidentiality 
Yes Guidelines intended to 
supplement any 
professional or ethical 
obligations applicable 
to Firm’s professional 
staff, including D.C. 
Rules of Professional 
Conduct 
 
Guidelines for 
Representation 
of Ex-Im Bank 
by Outside 
International 
Counsel in 
Finance Matters 
(April 2006) 
 
The Export-
Import Bank of 
the United States 
In general, quite combative Interrogatories and document requests:  
standard forms are default.  If counsel feels 
that this is unnecessary, settlement is to be 
considered and encouraged.  
Yes, control over 
handling litigation 
Yes, strict 
oversight 
and 
instructions. 
No Litigation Best 
Practices for 
Our Defense 
Counsel 
 
Universal 
Underwriters 
Group 
Matters relating to litigation proceedings 
(discovery, depositions, pleading, etc.) are 
referred to only in the context of in-house 
supervision and approval; No mention of 
litigation “policy” or “principles” 
 
Ethics:  “Wachovia is also committed to 
conducting its business in accordance with 
the highest ethical standards . . .  If Outside 
Counsel reasonably believes that a material 
violation of law may have occurred, is 
occurring or is about to occur at or 
involving Wachovia, as set forth in Section 
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
and the SEC Rules promulgated thereunder 
(see 17 CFR §205), Outside Counsel must 
immediately and confidentially contact a 
Deputy General Counsel or Wachovia’s 
General Counsel and the responsible Legal 
Division Lawyer.” 
 
Diversity:  “Wachovia encourages the 
retention of minorities and women by all 
law firms providing legal services to 
Wachovia. . . .  Wachovia expects that 
Outside Counsel will have professional 
women and minorities work on its legal 
matters.  To monitor Outside Counsel’s 
diversity commitment, Wachovia requests 
Outside Counsel to submit certain 
information regarding the use of women 
and minorities, as well as other 
relationship data to the extent available.” 
 
High quality, cost-
effective legal 
services; 
confidentiality 
(including bank 
privacy 
legislation)  
 “Provide excellent 
legal services in a 
timely and cost- 
effective manner 
following the highest 
ethical standards” 
General 
Guidance for 
Outside counsel 
Wachovia 
Corporation 
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Comments 
 
Content Conflict of 
interest and 
confidentiality  
Billing  General approach 
to ethics 
Means of 
oversight 
Corporation 
 
Detailed guidelines for litigation in general:  
Early Case assessment and case management; 
encouragement of early settlement resolution  
Diversity:  “We expect Outside Counsel to 
make a good faith effort to recruit, retain, 
and promote qualified women and 
minorities . . .”  
 
Managing Litigation:  the most detailed 
expectations for ethical conduct relate to 
adversary and court.  “Honor the spirit, 
intent, and requirements of all rules of civil 
procedure and rules of professional 
conduct; Conduct themselves in a manner 
that enhances and preserves the dignity and 
integrity of the system of justice; Adhere 
to the principles and rules of conduct 
which further the truth seeking process so 
that disputes will be resolved in a just, 
dignified, courteous and efficient manner; 
Make reasonable responses to discovery.” 
 
Conflict of 
interest; 
confidentiality  
Yes, 
detailed. 
“Outside Counsel are 
not just providers of 
services but are vital 
partners in our success. 
It is critical that 
Outside Counsel share 
the commitment of the 
Walmart Legal 
Department to 
providing the 
Company with the 
highest quality legal 
services in the most 
cost-effective manner 
possible.  We expect 
Outside Counsel to 
stress integrity, 
professionalism. . . .” 
General requirement 
for “Ethical Conduct” 
and reporting 
requirements  
 
Outside 
Counsel 
Guidelines 
Walmart 
Restrictions in cases where there is no defense 
are versed as part of the policy to resolve cases 
quickly rather than acting ethically 
 Description of 
goal:  “We seek to 
achieve consistent 
and efficient 
processes yet also 
to manage, not 
merely process, 
our cases. . . 
Where there is no 
defense to a claim 
or where there is a 
significant risk of 
an adverse finding 
against an 
Insured, all efforts 
should be made to 
effect settlement 
as early as 
possible. . .” 
 
Yes The company “expects 
to work with claims 
defense counsel and its 
customers to achieve 
the best result for the 
customer in an 
efficient and cost-
conscious manner 
consistent with the law 
firm’s ethical 
obligations.  Nothing 
contained herein is 
intended to nor shall 
restrict counsel’s 
exercise of 
independent 
professional judgment 
in rendering legal 
services for the insured 
or otherwise interfere 
with any ethical 
directive . . . .”       
 
Guidelines for 
Claims Defense 
Counsel 
Zurich Insurance 
